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ABSTRACT
This paper introduces the central dimensions which have emerged
in the current welfare reform debate. They include adaquacy, work in-
centives, family stability and cost. The last legislative session intro-
duced a new group of "welfare reform" proposals, each attempting to
address these critiques of the current welfare system. Considering four
major bills including Carter's Comprehensive Program for Better Jobs
and Income on the basis of recent research findings, results in a
tentative preference for Carter's plan. It addresses the major reform
dimensions better than the others and would result in modest improve-
ments. Nevertheless, true reform is unlikely to be achieved by any
of these approaches if more fundamental intervention in the labor
market is not taken.
The welfare reform debate has been rescued once more by the Carter
Administration from the domain of academics and the social welfare
community. It has resided there since its ignominious fall from favor
after the defeat of the Family Assistance Plan (FAP). In the new round
of public discussions very little of its fundamental content has changed
in over a decade. Indeed, the central issues of debate and the ideolo-
gical positions which seize them have remained remarkably unscathed by
the multitude of important social and economic changes which have
occurred over the last decade.
Though the prevailing concerns of welfare reform have remained
relatively unchanged, the political climate in which reform must take
place has altered considerably. Years of seemingly uncontrollable
inflation and unemployment, coupled with a view that government cannot
work, have soured many on the value of large government policies and
programs. This is reinforced by the recent onslought of taxpayer re-
volt against government spending and the attendant fraud and mismanage-
ment perceived as an inevitable counterpart of government programs.
At the same time, however, considerable progress has been made in
the state of social science knowledge. Several income maintenance
experiments have been completed, analyses of longitudinal data sources
circulated, and a variety of important social science evidence on the
nature and determinants of poverty permit a more informed discussion
of the policy options.
Nevertheless, politics and research continue to be inextricably
bound to one another and the current interpretations of the relationships
of recent research findings to proposed bills for welfare reform have
not been completely satisfying. This paper will attempt to assess the
value that current research findings have for selecting among the major
welfare reform proposals.
These dimensions represent those which political debate has
identified as critical. They do not represent the full array of values
or goals around which social planners might design an optimal system.
Rather, they address the more practical and less idealized dimensions
which policy analysts are required to consider in constructing a wel-
fare reform plan acceptable to a reluctant constituency.
A brief description of the major legislation currently under con-
sideration will be presented. Finally, the results of empirical re-
search will be applied to an assessment of the degree to which existing
proposals can be expected to address the major welfare reform issues.
Will the welfare reform plans as conceived reform welfare in response
to these concerns? The paper will conclude with a discussion which
explains the often inappropriate and inadequate use of the growing
body of social science research in designing and evaluating welfare
policy.
ENDURING ISSUES IN THE WELFARE REFORM DEBATE
Adequacy
The first dimension or goal currently considered in the welfare
reform debate is the adequacy of current benefit levels. Proponents
of welfare reform generally point to the great disparity in the level
of current benefits available to similar families in various jurisdic-
tions. Attempts to establish a floor of income eligible families
nationally have been part of the reform movement since FAP. Critics
argue that benefit disparities are inherently inequitable and impose
undue hardships on participating families in low paying states. Some
have argued that interstate disparities encourage the migration of
eligibles from low benefit to high benefit states. Further, many
argue that the failure of most states to provide benefits at a level
consistent with the federal poverty line results in an unacceptable
level of suffering and hardship when national policy has for some
time been concerned with poverty reduction. Fewer than twenty-six
states currently pay AFDC benefits as large as 2/3 the federal Poverty
families for whom the wages of the male head were inadequate to lift
them from poverty, dissolving their marriages (either real or
feigned) would make them better off. The woman would then be
eligible for AFDC as head of a family. Whatever additional income
sources the former spouse could provide would make them still better
off.
The welfare system, it has been argued, has thus provided the
incentive for economically rational families to split up. Further,
since no federal cash program covers poor single individuals, it is
also claimed that poor women have an incentive to bear illegitimate
children in order to meet the eligibility requirements for AFDC.
Critics of the current system often observe that AFDC discourages poor
young women from marrying the fathers of their offspring by rendering
them ineligible for any assistance if they did.
Finally, many have suspected that granting higher benefits with
increasing family size in the AFDC program results in an implicit
incentive for welfare mothers to bear more children than they otherwise
would. This pro-natalist orientation of the current welfare system
is believed by some to result in larger families and increased
dependency.
Issues related to the perverse incentives for family composition
under the current AFDC program are becoming increasingly central to
the assessments of alternative options for welfare reform. Each
major policy initiative currently awaiting legislative consideration
has taken this alleged impact of the current system for granted,
offering changes which are assumed to reverse the increasing family
dissolution apparent under current arrangements.
Costs
Concern about program costs in the existing income maintenance
system influence legislative response to almost every element in the
design of a welfare reform alternative. A particular dilemma in the
welfare reform debate involves the cost implications of the tradeoffs
between benefit adequacy and benefit uniformity. Establishing a
uniform level of benefits nationally, without making current recipients
worse off, requires setting a floor of benefits at a level as high as
are currently paid in states more nearly approaching the poverty
standard. This results in an extremely costly program, since dra-
matic increases in benefit levels are required to bring low-paying
states to this level of adequacy. The less costly option, that of
establishing a uniform floor of benefits at a far more modest level,
compromises the adequacy of benefits in all states. When additional
goals such as increased overage are included, the dilemma becomes
worse.
standard and as many as ten provide less than 2/3 the federal poverty
standard when the value of food stamp bonuses is included.
Not only the generosity and uniformity of benefits is included
when the debate addresses adequacy, but implicit in these discussions
is coverage. Twenty-four states deny benefits altogether to two parent
families and no federal program exists to cover singles or childless
couples. In states which have an AFDC-UF program, eligibility rules
often exclude many needy families from participating. Of the 11.8
million non-elderly poor* in 1967, 6.7 million remained poor even after
welfare transfer income (CBO, 1977). Though many families are made
better off by welfare, many other families do not have resources
(welfare and non-welfare income) which approach the national poverty
standard. These facts are even more dramatic when one recalls that the
federal poverty standard is based on the Department of Agriculture's
lowest level budget capable of producing a nutritionally adequate
diet. Critics are not, then proposing extravagant benefit levels
when they speak of adequacy based on this standard (though they are
often accused of such).
Work Effort
Another issue of considerable importance in all discussions of
welfare is that of work effort. Critics of the current system argue
that the system discourages work in a variety of ways and, indeed, that
the system itself breeds continued dependency. No other issues appear
to loom larger than those concerning work in current or previous welfare
reform debates. In fact, almost all changes throughout the 1960's of
the Social Security Act have been made in response to the perceived
lack of work effort among recipient family heads. Two major changes
were made during that period in order to increase the labor force
participation of recipients. One was a mandated Work Incentive Program
(WIN), which required employable recipients to register for work
training or work placement. Failure to do so could result in with-
drawal of benefits. Similarly, provisions for day care services,
though limited, were made to permit mothers of small children to
register for training to work. The Talmadge amendments required wel-
fare mothers of children over six to register for WIN.
Thus, an attempt to require work as a condition of continuing
eligibility was institutionalized in the exisitng welfare system in AFDC.
The Food Stamp Program also included a work test. Other efforts to
encourage work were legislated through a reduction in the benefit re-
duction rate on earned income and more liberal procedures for deducting
work expenses in calculating benefits. Analysts had argued that a
dollar reduction of benefits for each dollar of earning provided a
*below 100% of the poverty line
strong work disincentive for participating families. Indeed, it meant
that, with modest wages, families would be no better off by working than
they would be by not working. The Social Security amendments in 1967
reduced the "tax" on earnings to 67 percent, while permitting working
recipients to retain the first $30 of monthly earnings without any
reduction of benefits.
Concerns about work effort, however, were not quelled. WIN slots
were limited and so were day care slots. Welfare case loads were
growing dramatically even as national unemployment rates were quite
low. Enforced work was viewed by many as a necessary component of any
further welfare reform. Other critics and analysts began to discover
that although the benefit reduction rate of AFDC was 67 percent, many
recipients of AFDC were also participating in a variety of other cash
or in-kind programs. Many of these programs, such as food stamps and
public housing, had their own benefit reduction rates on earnings.
Thus, the actual cumulative marginal tax rate effective as a function
of the additive rates from several programs could result in benefit re-
ductions of as high as 100 percent or more for each dollar of earnings.
The work disincentive effects of this were thought to be substantial.
Many critics of the current system, therefore, argue for a single
comprehensive cash program with a more modest tax rate.
Economists, while recognizing the potential work disincentive
effects of benefit rates, have also pointed to the work disincentive
effects of high guarantees. The guarantee is the level of benefits
available to an eligible family with no earnings. Those whose exclusive
priority is very strong work incentives favor both low tax rates and
low guarantees. A high guarantee, it is argued, competes with pre-
vailing wages and thus, the cost of not working may be very small for
a low wage worker eligible for a high guarantee. The debate over
the appropriate levels for both the guarantee and the tax rate in a
reformed welfare system has been at the center of academic and legis-
lative discussions since FAP. The difficulty of reaching compromises
involves the marginal impact that particular tax rates and guarantees
have on a variety of other critical priorities in welfare reform,
including adequacy, program costs, family stability, and equity.
Family Stability
The concern with family stability predated the welfare reform
initiatives of the Nixon administration. Witnessing increasing AFDC
caseload growth, policy makers and analysts began to observe that,
increasingly, the poor and the "dependent" were female-headed families.
Explanations of the increasing number of female-headed families gener-
ally included the incentives in current AFDC programs for family
break-up. A minority of states at that time had seized the federal
option to offer an AFDC-UF program which covered intact families
with an unemployed father. Even in states which had such a program,
eligibility criteria precluded participation of low-wage workers who
were employed more than 100 hours a month. Therefore, for many needy
The cost constraints at the national level are reinforced by the
problems experienced by many of the older cities and states in which
large numbers of the poor and welfare recipients live- Many cities
and states, particularly in the Northeast and Midwest, are facing
increasing welfare costs at a time when economic growth is declining
markedly. Indeed, these older cities and states are experiencing
declining revenues and population while demands for public and social
services are increasing. Most of these localities resist federal
initiatives which will require any further financial commitments from
their dwindling public treasureies. In fact, cities such as New York,
Boston, Detroit and Chicago are supporting legislative initiatives
which seek to relieve the fiscal burdens which now threaten to over-
whelm them.
Current financing arrangements for AFDC and Medicaid apportion
state-federal shares on the basis of a federal formula which compares
state median income to national median income. Several states then
apportion intra-state shares by city or county. New York, to cite an
extreme but important case, is required to finance a full 25 percent
of its welfare and Medicaid costs through its own revenues. These
expenditures constitute the second largest budget category for the
City. Thus, despite all the dimensions on which welfare reform might
be judged, program costs and fiscal relief to states and localities
may emerge as one of the critical criteria on which the potential
for legislative enactment will be judged.
Before considering the usefulness of the Carter Plan and the other
competing pieces of welfare reform legislation in addressing the issues
of adequacy, work, family stability and costs, it is necessary to
emphasize the complexity of these dimensions. The most difficult
problem in designing any social policy is the multiplicity of goals
which planners are simultaneously attempting to maximize in a
single program. Nowhere is the case more dramatic than in the design
of income maintenance programs. Competing goals, in this case,
means that maximizing any one may result in minimizing another. To take
a simple example, policy planners have for some time been committed
to minimizing the work disincentive effects implicit in an income
transfer program. At the same time, they may be required to minimize
increasing program costs.
The work disincentive effects allegedly promoted by the exis-
tence of a high marginal tax on earning (high benefit reduction rate)
can theoretically be mitigated through tax rate reduction. Though
a lower tax rate on earnings may reduce the labor force withdrawal of
participating families, at the same time it serves to increase dramati-
cally program costs. It does this for two reason. First, a lower
tax rate results in recipient families receiving benefits at higher
levels of income than they otherwise would. The level of income at
which-benefits fall to zero (the break-even point) is higher under
a lower tax rate. Second, not only do participating families
receive continued benefits at higher levels of income, but the
number of families eligible for benefits at higher levels is
far greater than at lower levels, given the current distribution of
income. Thus, the simultaneous goals of maximizing work incentives
while minimizing program costs cannot be achieved. Planners must
necessarily trade off acceptable levels of work effort for reduced
program costs or the converse. It is obvious that the larger the
number of goals, the more complex the nature of the trade-offs. Un-
fortunately, these issues are rarely resolved at the level of the analyst.
Indeed, they generally fall within the domain of political expediency.
CARTER'S WELFARE REFORM PLAN VS. THE COMPETITION
Evaluating any piece of social legislation requires a complex
analysis which includes not only an assessment of the projected
outcomes, given a set of goals, but also a marginal analysis of
the trade-offs between the costs and benefits of alternative means
toward the achievement of those goals. It is beyond the ambition of
this paper to carry out such an effort. Instead, the discussion will
limit itself to a more general review of current research findings
regarding a few key elements in the welfare reform debate. An attempt
will then be made to assess the wisdom of the major legislative
approaches to welfare reform, given the results of recent research.
Comprehensive Approaches
Conventional distinctions between comprehensive approaches and
incremental approaches to welfare reform are useful in grouping the
current available proposals in only the grossest way. A recent
paper by Levy (1978) suggests that a more useful approach would be to
see the current legislative options as a continuum on the basis of the
resources they provide and the reorganization they require.
The first two bills calling for "comprehensive reform" are
Carter's Plan for Better Jobs and Income (H.R. 9030) and the revision
of this bill introduced in Feb., 1978, by the Special House Subcommittee
on Welfare Reform (H.R. 10950). The two bills which call for "incre-
mental reform" include the Welfare Reform Act of 1978 (H.R. 10711),
introduced by Representative Ullman, and the Job Opportunities and
Family Security Program (S. 2777), sponsored by Senators Baker,
Bellman, Ribicoff, and Danforth.
The Adminsitrations proposal for Better Jobs and Income is
characterized by three major components: (1) comprehensive case
assistance which establishes a national floor of income for all families
or unrelated individuals; (2) a jobs component which mandates 1.4
million public service jobs for all adults in families with children
"expected to work" but who cannot find jobs in the private market;
and (3) an expanded Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) for low-income
workers employed in the private market.
The case component would consolidate a variety of existing
programs, including AFDC, AFDC-UF, SSI and Food Stamps. In addition,
it would provide federal coverage for groups currently ineligible
for assistance under existing federal assistance programs, such as
childless couples, single individuals, and two parent low-income
families. The bill also established two benefit tiers based on
whether family heads are "expected to work" or "not expected to
work." Those not expected to work include the elderly (over 65),
the blind, the disabled, single family heads with children under
seven. One adult in all other households would be expected to work,
including one adult in two-parent households, single individuals and
childless couples, and single parents with children under 14.
Single parents with children between the ages of seven and thirteen
would be expected to work part-time.
Those who head families but who are not expected to work would
be eligible for benefits on the upper tier which vary by family
size and other demographic characteristics related to need. Examples
of the benefit levels available to those on the upper tier would
include $2500 for a disabled or aged individual with no income,
$3750 for a similar couple, and $4200 for a single parent family of
four with at least one child under seven.
Those expected to work would be eligible for reduced benefits
on the lower tier. For example, a family of four in which an adult
member was expected to work would be eligible for a benefit amount
of $2300. After an eight week job search, if no private employment
could be found or placement in a public service job arranged, the
family would move automatically to the upper tier. (The Subcommittee
proposal reduces this period to five weeks.) If an adult expected to
work were employed in a private sector job, the $2300 supplementation
would begin to be reduced by a benefit reduction rate of 50 percent up
to a break-even of $8400. In addition, an adult on the lower tier who
is working would be eligible for an expanded EITC. For example, for
a family of four this would amount to 10 percent of earnings up to
$4000, 5 percent up to $9100, and would be reduced by 10 percent
above $9100. At $15,650 the credit would fall to zero.
The Carter Plan thus integrates income support systems for the
working and the non-working poor. It establishes a national floor
of income support and makes jobs in the private sector more desirable
than public jobs, while still offering work to those who cannot find
private employment. It provides federal financing while offering
incentives for state supplementation of basic income support levels.
In addition, though a description will be omitted here, there are
dramatic changes in administration and state-federal responsibilities,
as well as innumerable regulations, including how income is defined,
over what period it is measured for benefit calculation, definitions
of filing units, allowable asset limits, deductible work expenses and
other important design features.
The Subcommittee proposal, while similar, alters financing
arrangement, state-federal responsibility, and the rules and procedures
applicable to the aged, blind and disabled. Federal costs of the
Subcommittee proposal are now estimated to be substantilly higher
than the $19.14 billion first-year cost attributed to the Adminis-
tration proposal.* It reduces, however the costs to the states from
what it would be under the Administration plan.
Incremental Approaches
The Ullman proposal falls under the more "incremental" approaches
to welfare reform and, indeed, has a more limited range of goals. Its
major reform feature concerns setting a minimum cash value of AFDC and
Food Stamps for families with children, while retaining existing SSI
coverage for the aged, blind, and disabled. Food Stamp coverage for
single individuals and childless couples would continue in its
current form. The bill seeks to achieve welfare reform by modifying
current programs. It mandates AFDC-UF for all two-parent families in
all states, while simultaneously requiring minimum benefit levels for
both AFDC and AFDC-UF. The benefit levels in the bill, however, do
not vary by family size. The proposal also expands the Earned
Income Tax Credit. The credit is 30 percent of earnings up to $5000.
The credit remains constant at $1000 between $5000 and $7500. It is
then reduced by 13 percent as earnings rise above $7500, until its
value falls to zero at $15,200.
In addition, the Ullman bill provides modest resources ($5.07
billion) for the creation of approximately 560,000 jobs to be ad-
ministered by the WIN program. First priority of jobs is given to
principal wage earners in two-parent families who are unemployed and
have been receiving AFDC-UF for 16 weeks. A variety of other ad-
ministrative features are also contained in the Ullman proposal.
First, there is a provision which adjusts state minimum benefit levels
to reflect changes in the state's median income over time. It utilizes
retrospective accounting which requires recoupment of excess benefits
from families whose monthly income on which benefits were based is not
reflective of annual income. Because the Ullman bill maintains to
a greater extent than the previous proposals continued federal-state
partnership in the administration and financing of welfare efforts,
*cost estimates for the Administration proposal differ dramatically
depending upon the assumptions used. The figure cited is a CBO pro-
jection for FY 1982. The Subcommittee Bill is projected to cost
$20.22 billion in FY 1982.
cost estimates indicate that for FY 1982 estimated federal cost will
be between $8 and $9 billion while state and other levels of government
will assume costs of about $6.5 - $8 billion. These estimates were
made by the House Ways and Means Committee.
The Baker-Bellmon bill (S. 2777) is roughly similar in nature
to the Ullman bill. Its goals for reform of the current system are
far more modest than the comprehensive proposals. It seeks first
to achieve a minimum benefit standard for families with children,
while maintaining existing SSI coverage for the aged, blind, and dis-
abled, and retains Food Stamp coverage for childless couples and single
individuals. It has far less emphasis on putting recipients to work
in public service jobs and requires no substantial administrative reor-
ganization or program consolidation.
Specifically, it would mandate AFDC-UF in all states. Minimum
benefits for AFDC and AFDC-UF would be tied to the federal poverty
standard and would vary by family size. The benefit standards in-
clude the value of food stamps. This level would be 60 percent of the
poverty standard. Based on current standards, minimum benefit
levels for a family of four would be $3875 (AFDC cash standard is
$1764 plus a food stamps value of $2111). The benefit levels would
rise in response to the impact inflation has on the poverty standard
over time. In addition, goals are set which would require benefits to
increase to 65 percent of the poverty standard by 1985.
The bill changes the current EITC for the working poor by
setting an earnings limit equal to the poverty line. The credit
would equal 15 percent of earnings up to that point and phase it out
by 20 percent of all earnings over the limit. The poverty standard
for 1978, as currently projected, is $6350 for a family of four.
Under this bill the maximum credit for a family of four would be $952
with earnings of $6350. The breakeven level would be reached when
earnings are above $11,100.
Unlike any of the previously reviewed proposals, the Baker-
Bellmon bill authorizes no resources for the creation of public
service jobs. In fact, the bill would cut back the existing level of
Title VI CETA jobs from the existing level of 750,000 to 375,000 in
1982. These remaining jobs would be reserved first for principal
wage earners in two-parent families receiving AFDC-UF for at least
90 days. Any remaining jobs could then be filled by single-parent
household heads or others unemployed for at least 26 weeks. The bill
does, however, authorize resources to provide incentives for private
job creation through a tax credit or job voucher for private employers
willing to employ a former assistance recipient. There would be a
ceiling on the maximum credits permitted and regulations prohibiting
the displacement of regular workers. No employer could receive both
credits and vouchers simultaneously. The bill, therefore, provides
no systematic reorganization or dramatic changes in existing programs.
It seeks modest goals through marginal reform much like that of the
Ullman bill.
The brief descriptions of the major existing proposals for
welfare reform are probably less important individually than they
are as a group. None is likely to be enacted in its current form.
They are probably more important as a group because they represent the
current range of thinking among policy makers and because the form
they take indicates a variety of underlying diagnoses of the current
system and the nature and causes of poverty and dependency. Recent
research has provided a considerable mass of findings which is beginning
to reveal new perspectives on poverty and dependency. The dimensions
of the welfare reform debate reviewed earlier can be usefully applied
through the consideration of what the empirical data indicate will be
the likely impact of any of these new proposals. The remainder of
the paper will concern itself with evaluating the impact of the various
types of reform proposals on the status and behavier of the poor.
THE WELFARE REFORM BILLS AND THE RESEARCH
Research on the behavior of welfare recipients in response to
existing and proposed income maintenance programs have been financed
and initialed to a large degree by governments at the local, state
and federal level. Most research has been motivated by government
concern about growing case loads and rising costs. It is, therefore,
not surprising that questions related to work effort have dominated
the research agenda. As we will discuss in the concluding section,
inadequate consideration of exogenous labor market determinants of
work and welfare patterns means that existing research may place far
too much significance on the independent impact of changing the
parameters of income maintenace programs.
Nevertheless, the preponderance of research has contributed
significantly to our understanding of the importance of using
policy analytic approaches in assessing proposed programs. Using
research finding does help to avoid unanticipated consequences often
associated with past program changes. (see Sanger, 1979)
Adaquacy
All the major bills deal to some degree with the claim that current
programs provide inadequate benefits. Each sets a national floor of
benefits for the populations which it seeks to cover. The Ullman
bill and the Baker-Bellmon bill, however, limit proposed coverage
exclusively to families with children. The Adminsitration bill and the
Subcommittee bill not only seek to establish a minimum floor of income
but also to cover all individuals regardless of family composition
exclusively on the basis of need.
The underlying research question in determining the adequacy of
existing proposals is, what will the distribution of income among
poverty families look like after the enactment of any of the programs?
Benefit levels alone have been an inadequate measure of economic
well-being for all recipient families since, in existing programs,
most families do not depend on AFDC benefits as their only source of
income. Recent research has been showing, for example, that the in-
cidence of multiple benefits is quite common (Bernstein, et al.,
1973; Lyon, et al., 1976) and that if the cash value of all in-kind
benefits were included in calculations of resources available to
recipient families, many more would be enjoying command-over-
resources equal to or exceeding existing poverty standards (Lyon, et al.,
1976). Clearly, the situation is not the same in all states. This
remains one of the problems; adequacy of existing benefits varies
profoundly.
Not only are multiple benefits and the values of in-kind benefits
important in determining the adequacy of existing benefits, but so too
is the degree to which many recipients have access to other sources
of income. A recent study using longitudinal data from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) revealed that when "ever Welfare"
families (headed by women) were followed over time, evidence was
found of substantial serial and simultaneous work and welfare mixes.
Except for some long-term dependent cases, women while on welfare over
the seven years of the study, had between 25 percent and 33 percent of
their total family income derived from earnings. (Rein, 1977) Of
all low income women who headed families over five years of the study,
77 percent worked at some time (Hausman & Friedman, 1975). This
suggests that the value of welfare benefits at zero income may not
be an entirely useful measure of the adequacy of the resources availale
to all potential welfare recipients. The value of benefits available
at zero earnings is, however, a useful and accurate reflection of
economic well-being for those groups in which the incidence of earnings
from work or from other forms of assistance are not substantial. For
those groups, such as the aged, blind, and disabled, the value of
Food Stamps plus SSI benefits is an appropriate measure on which
to evaluate adequacy.
The descriptions of the proposed reform programs above failed to
indicate the degree to which they would encourage state supplementation
of the federal floor of benefits. This inducement to states might be
a significant determinant of the level of adequacy provided by each
program. However, while the degree of state supplementation is likely
to affect how the adequacy of proposals may be judged, it is also
likely to extend the existing criticisms of lack of uniformity. State
supplementation incentives will make it advantageous for states to
assume responsibility for increasing federal benefit levels, but
there are regional disparities in the degree of commitment to social
welfare expenditures. Short of mandating state supplementation,
any incentive scheme is likely to perpetuate existing regional dis-
parities in welfare effort.
There are considerable uncertainties which exist in estimating
the comparative level of adequacy implicit in each of the proposals
reviewed. The first depends on the level of work effort of participating
families. It was mentioned above that female heads of families have
a strong connection to the labor market. Nevertheless, their hours of
work are generally less than male heads of low-income families. Male
heads of low-income families have very strong attachment to the labor
force. Ninety percent of non-white males and ninety-seven percent of
white males work. They, in general, work extensively and have
average hours of work near or above average hours for the labor
force as a whole (Levy, 1976).
The composition of eligibles is therefore important in deter-
mining adequacy of benefit levels. Access to additional sources of
income and the probability of seeking and finding work varies among
different demographic groups. Work, it has been found, is far more
pervasive among traditional welfare eligibles than has previously
been appreciated. Many view, however , that the degree of compulsion
and penalties regulating work, as well as the availability and pro-
vision of public service jobs, will also affect the average income
available to eligible families and individuals.
The Administration proposal and the Subcommittee revised version
provide most promise for increased adequacy. Because the proposals
do not maintain traditional categorical distinctions, presumably
coverage would be universal and participation rates would likely be
quite high. Distinctions would be made, however, between those
expected to work and those not expected to work. The adequacy of
benefits available to those not expected to work are reasonably
simple to estimate. Without state supplementation the guarantee for
a family of four would be 2/3 the poverty standard. This level of
support would be higher than existing entitlements for AFDC and Food
Stamps in ten states. Current benefits available in all states for
combined SSI and Food Stamp entitlements for the aged, blind, and dis-
abled exceed the Administration proposal's benefits of $3750 for a
couple and $2500 for an individual. The Subcommittee proposal provides
for the retainment of benefit levels for the aged, blind, and disabled
as a separate component at current levels.
Supplementation therefore becomes central for these groups in
assessing their relative level of well-being under these comprehensive
plans, as compared to existing programs. The Administration bill en-
courages supplementation by absorbing 75 percent of the additional
state costs required to raise the state minimum benefit level to
$4717 or about 3/4 of the projected 1978 poverty standard. Further
encouragement is provided through a federal cost assumption of 25
percent of the expenditures states assume to raise minimum benefit
levels to $6350, the projected 1978 poverty standard.
Similar inducements are provided for supplementation for those
groups expected to work under the Administration and Subcommittee
proposals. There would be a 75 percent assumption of costs by the
federal government for states which raise the guarantee for workers
during their job search period from the federal minimum guarantee of
$2300 to $2583; the same would apply for a state which raised the
minimum benefit level for those expected to work, when no jobs were
available, from the federal guarantee of $4200 to $4717. The Sub-
committee proposal, however, pays 75 percent of the state cost of
raising the guarantee from $4200 to $4700 and 25 percent from $4717
to the poverty line or the state's current level of AFDC plus Food
Stamps, whichever is higher.
Though the costs are assumed by the federal government at up to
75 percent for state supplementation to $4717, it should be emphasized
that currently, in many of the lowest paying states, federal cost
sharing for welfare programs is often as high as 83 percent. Never-
theless, these are often the states where benefit levels remain the
lowest in the country. Further, even at a 75 percent rate of federal
matching, $4717 remains lower than the combined value of AFDC and
Food Stamps in many of the most generous states. Therefore, the level
of adequacy for those not expected to work is likely to be increased
in some states, while there is some indication that there will be
places where families will be made worse off under these proposed
benefit levels, even with the incentives for state supplementation.
For those expected to work, thesituation is likely to be better
under these proposals. Since the guarantee is less likely to be
considered apart from earnings for these recipients, and because re-
search shows that these groups work extensively, the combined value
of benefits and wages will probably provide a more useful measure of
adequacy (after considering the tax rate). Both bills contain a
large jobs componenet with a strong EITC for those employed in private
sector jobs.
A recent study (Sulvetta, 1978) has estimated the impact of the
Administration proposal on benefits for the poor. Tables 1 and 2 com-
pare the status of both those expected and not expected to work under
current programs and the Administration program. Based on a family of
four where an adult is expected to work, comparisons can be made with
existing benefit levels for those assumed to be employed in public
sector jobs under the Administration proposal.
TABLE 1
Comparison of PBJI Benefits and Existing Benefits in
Low-, Moderate-, and High-Benefit AFDC States
Current Program Benefits I PBJI
Type of Unit Low-Benefit Median-Benefit High Benefit Cash Benefits
State 2  State
3  State 4  & PSE Income
Single Individual $ 624 $ 624 $ 624 $1,100
Aged, Blind, or Dis-
abled Individual 2,356 2,688 2,868 2,500
Couple with no
children 1,128 1,128 1,128 2,200
Aged, Blind, or Dis-
abled Couple 3,539 3,980 4,112 3,750
2-Parent,2-Child Family
with 1 Parent (6,956








State 2,040 2,040 2,040 6,956
1-Parent Family with
3 Children over 13 3,444 5,164 6,524 6,956
1-Parent Family with
3 Children Age 7-13 3 ,44 4a 5,164 6 ,5 24b 4,950
1-Parent Family with
3 Children under 7 3 ,44 4a 5,164 6 ,5 24b 4,200
1. Annual benefits include food stamps, SSI, and AFDC where applicable.
2. Assumes AFDC and SSI benefits = to level paid by South Carolina.
Maximum annual amount paid for an AFCD family of 4 in 1977 was $1,404, &
basic federal benefits were paid to SSI participants.
3. Assumes AFDC benefit = to that paid in Maine. Maximum annual AFDC
amount paid for a family of 4 in 1977 was $3,768. SSI payments were $2,254
per individual and $3,768 per couple. See table 5 for an explanation of
benefit composition.
4. Assumes AFDC and SSI benefits = to that paid by New York. Maximum
AFDC annual amount paid for a family of 4 in 1977 was $5,712.
5. See table 9 for component breakdown.
a. Includes AFDC benefit of $1,404 and food stamp benefit of $2,040
calculated as $2,040- (.3(1,404) - (720+ 900)).
b. Includes AFDC benefit of $5,712 and food stamp benefit of $812 cal-
culated as $2,040 - (.3(5,712) - (720 + 900)).
Source: Sjjivets 107R! , 1A
TABLE 2
Comparison of Existing Benefits and Proposed PBJI Benefits
when Head of Family Is Expected to Work and Is Employed
at Minimum Wage in Private Sector Job
Current Program PBJI
Type of Unit Annual Annual
Earnings Benefits Total Earnings Benefits Total
Single Individual $5,512 $ 0 $5,512 $5,512 $ 0 $5,512
Couple with no
Children 5,512 0 5,512 5,512 0 5,512
Two-Parent Family
with 2 Children 5,512 1 ,45 2a 6,964 5,512 1 ,9 20c 7,432
Single-Parent Family
with 3 Children
over Age 13 5,512 1,452 a  6,964 5,512 1,920c  7,432
Single-Parent Family
with 3 Children
Age 7-13 2,756 4 ,778b 7,534 2,756 2 ,5 76d 5,332
Note: Assumes 1978 projected minimum wage of $2.65 per hour, or $5,512 for
fulltime employment, $2,756 for half-time employment.
a. Includes earned income tax credit of $249 plus food stamp benefit of
$1,203. Earned income tax credit calculated as (.1(4,000) - .1(5,512 -
4,000)). Food stamp benefit calculated as $2,040 - (.3(5,512 - (720 +
900 + .2(5,512)).
b. Includes earned income tax credit of $276, Maine AFDC benefit of $3,768,
plus food stamp benefit of $734 calculated as $2,040 - .3(6,524 - (720 +
900 + .2(2,756)). This assumes that allowable child care deductions more
than cover the loss in AFDC benefits due to earnings.
c. Cash benefit of $1,444 plus earned income tax credit of $476.
d. Cash benefit of $2,300 plus earned income tax credit of $276 computed
as 10 percent of income up to $4,000. Although benefits are reduced by
50 cents for every dollar of earnings, an annual child care deduction of
up to $1,800 for one child and $3,600 for two or more children is permitted.
Source: Sulvetta, 1978;
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The degree of impact is related to whether or not male-headed
families reside in states which currently operate an AFDC-UF program.
For those families in states where no such program exists, the joint
value of wages at the level of the minimum wage and cash benefits
would make them far better off. In fact, expected value of wages
and cash benefits would result in income in excess of the poverty
standard, For those residing in states which operate an AFDC-UF
program, their status would still be substantially improved by the
administration proposal.
For those family heads expected to work who find private employ-
ment, even at the minimum wage, the situation is far better still.
Table 2 indicates that when the value of AFDC or AFDC-UF benefits
are combined with both Food Stamps and the current value of the EITC,
working family heads in private employment are still far better off
under the Administration proposal than they are under any combination
of exisitng transfer programs. The only exception to this is for the
single parent household assumed to be working part-time. Current
benefits for it are substantially better under current arrangements
than under those proposed by the Administration.
The critical factor here, in terms of the average adequacy of
proposed benefits, is the fact that coverage would be greatly increased
as compared with existing programs. Though comparisons have been
made with family heads in states with AFDC-UF, it should be clear that
participantion rates are quite low in these programs, even in states
which have them. For example, for large numbers of low-wage workers
residing in states with no AFDC-UF programs, benefits available
include only the value of Food Stamps and the current EITC. No other
cash benefits are currently available to the working poor in those
states. Indeed, even in states operating an AFDC-UF program, monthly
employment in excess of 100 hours excludes any participation for
families with working heads, even if their income is quite low.
Coverage of the working poor, whether in families with children or
not, clearly results in raising substantially the aggregate level of
adequacy of command-over-resources for millions of currently ineligible
families.*
The Ullman proposal and the Baker-Bellman proposal fall far
short of the Administration and Subcommittee proposals on the basis
of the adequacy of benefits provided. Neither extends coverage to
The benefit levels used are the median benefit levels paid in a
representative state paying moderate benefits (e.g. Maine).
The Subcommittee proposal goes even further in insuring an increased
level of adequacy by proposing to legislate the indexing of welfare
benefits for changes in the cost of living.
childless couples or individuals. Both retain the Food Stamp program
which restricts the use of a large part of the total value of benefits
available to food, exclusively. Both bills mandate AFDC-UF coverage in
all states. The Ullman proposal restricts participation to these
families if their monthly income exceeds $350. It would permit a
federal AFDC-UF benefit level of $200 per month ($2400 per year) for
male-headed families with, no income. Aid would be available for a
maximum of 17 weeks at federal expense if no public service job were
available. States would be required to extend aid for an additional
35 weeks at their own expense. States would be permitted to supplement
the federal minimum of $200 per month by as much as $150, but the
costs of doing so would be entirely their own. Retaining the Food
Stamp program would result in an estimated yearly benefit level for a
two parent family of four of $4080. These restrictions must be
seen as particularly harsh given the fact that all minima and maxima
are not adjusted, as in the previous proposals, for family size. The
result, therefore, is obvious. Total benefit levels for intact
families, though higher than are AFDC and Food Stamp benefits currently
available in seven states, do not go far enough in approaching
the poverty standard. Large families, a major cause of poverty among
the working poor, will be made the worst off among both intact and
female-headed families.
Adequacy, it has been argued, can be judged best for those expected
to work, based on the expected value of both wages and benefits available.
The Ullman proposal allocates $5.07 billion for public job creation
(approximately 560,000 jobs). These are to be administered through the
WIN program. This compares with an estimated 1.4 million jobs budgeted
to be created in the Administration proposal. The Ullman bill gives
first priority to male heads of intact families already receiving AFDC-UF
who have been receiving assistance for 16 weeks. The jobs are therefore
largely reserved for those who, after a relatively long search period,
still remain unemployed. Wages would be at the minimum wage and credits
would be available to private employers willing to hire WIN registrants.
In general, benefits are available only to families with children
and those already eligible for SSI. Benefit levels mandated are low
in comparison with the comprehensive proposals, as is the proposed
increase in the EITC. No substantial incentives exist for state sup-
plementation and the proposed level of job creation appears low. WIN
has not had a very strong history of success in training and placement
of its registrants and there are no indications that they are now
either equipped to undertake or capable of undertaking substantial job
creation, even with the proposed mandate to contract with CETA prime
sponsors. The lack of benefit adjustments for family size appears
particularly harsh, based on recent research indicating that among
the working poor this appears to be a major source of hardship, even
for those employed in stable jobs. (Levy, 1976).
The Baker-Bellman bill is even less generous in most respects
than the Ullman bill. It also retains existing programs but mandates
AFDC-UF. Far from removing the 100 hour eligibility criterion which now
results in such low participation among families with an unemployed father,
the Baker-Bellmon bill merely retains the troublesome "notch" problems
at a new level by setting an eligibility requirement of income less
than 130 times the minimum wage for benefits for families with an
unemployed parent--($3445). This results in ineligibility for families
with income in excess of $3445. This appears to be the case regardless
of family size.
Benefit levels would be set at 60 percent of the poverty standard.
This would include the joint value of Food Stamps and mandated state
minimum benefits. This requirement, however, causes benefit levels to
vary with family size. For an AFDC family of four the 1978 cash standard
of combined value of AFDC and Food Stamps would equal a total benefit
of $3875. This exceeds the current state benefit levels of only five
states. This benefit standard would apply to both AFDC and AFDC-UF
households. SSI would be retained in current form. A target date is
set for 1985 to increase mandated minimum benefit levels to 65 percent
of the poverty standard.
Though benefit levels are quite low, generous incentives for
state supplementation would exist. Any state now paying above the
federal minimal level mandated would be required to retain current
levels; (i.e. current recipients would not be made worse off as they
would be under other proposals.) Federal cost sharing which now bases
the federal rate of cost assumption on the relationship between
state median income and the national median income would be modified
from the existing range of 50 - 83 percent in the following manner:
in 1980 the federal cost share would rise to 120 percent of its obliga-
tion under the existing formula. It would increase to 140 percent in
1981 and 160 percent in 1982. This would occur until a state's
level of benefits reached the official poverty standard, after which
any additional benefit increases would be exclusively assumed by the
state.
Provision for public job creation is even less than under the Ullman
proposal. The Baker-Bellman bill would retain current resources for
providing the existing level of CETA public service jobs through 1979.
At that point the allocations would decline over a four year period to
reach a level of only 250,000 slots in 1983, providing that the national
level of unemployment does not exceed 6 percent. The major instrument
that the bill proposes for job creation is a system of either job
vouchers or job credits for private sector employers who hire AFDC
recipients unemployed 26 weeks, provided that they pay the prevailing
wage and that there is no job displacement.
Based on the conventional level of adequacy established by the
federal poverty standard, no bill yet proposed insures that minimal
level of adequacy. Only the Administration and Subcommittee bills
insure this level of adequacy for those who are working. Further,
the Ullman and the Baker-Bellmon bills exclude from any more support
than current programs provide, large numbers of childless couples and
single individuals. Though the incremental bills increase the present
value of the EITC now available, neither bill insures a job for those
expected to work. None of the bills totally resolves the difficult
problem of wide national variation among states in their benefit
levels. Though all do set a minimum floor under that part of the
population to be covered, in both incremental bills the floor is so
low that most states already pay that minimum level of benefits.
Substantial incentives exist for state supplementation in all
but the Ullman bill. But state supplementation is ultimately a mixed
blessing. It may result in disparities in benefit levels regionally.
States which have traditionally been more generous in their commitment
to welfare support will probably remain so, while those states which
have not been so generous in their commitments will probably retain
their traditionally low levels of support.
Throughout, an effort has been made to compare the value of
existing benefits to those proposed for different groups in the com-
peting proposals. No mention has been made of the important contri-
bution that the value of in-kind benefits now available to welfare
eligibles through Medicaid might have. The Medicaid dilemma, and how
it will be resolved, has important implications for comparing proposed
income transfer systems to the existing one. Presumably, the incre-
mental proposals would retain existing Medicaid eligibility to partici-
pating families. The value of these benefits has been shown to be
substantial. (Lyon, et al., 1976) The comprehensive proposals have
not attempted to extend Medicaid eligibility to groups which would
for the first time become eligible for income transfers under their
proposals. Many suspect that this will result in undue hardship
and implicit inequities in the value of benefits to similarly situated
families within the new program; that is, those eligible under existing
programs will remain eligible under the reform proposals, but those
newly enfranchised will have no such option. If states are required
to assume all responsibility for Medicaid to new eligibles, the costs
may be tremendous. It will encourage further state disparities as
well as interfere with state supplementation incentives. The Sub-
committee and Administration proposals have left this question un-
resolved because of the expectation that national health insurance
will soon make it a moot point. In the meantime, however, it weakens
the adequacy of the proposals while retaining a troublesome "notch"
often criticized as part of the exisitng system.
The goals of simultaneously providing an adequate level of resources
and universal coverage are not met by any of the major legislative
proposals. Nevertheless, the Subcommittee and Administration proposals
make a dramatic effort in beginning to approach those goals. The
problem of making judgments in a vacuum about a particular goal in
welfare reform becomes obvious. Economic theory and empirical re-
search point to the danger of high guarantees. Work disincentive
effects and costs must be traded off against adequacy. The next
section will begin to place the relative merits of these competing
goals in perspective. Though adequacy remains a critical factor in
any attempt to design and evaluate a new income transfer system,
additional concerns weight heavily in determining the optimal mix
of program parameters.
Work Effort
No issue in the welfare reform debate has received more attention
in the popular media or research community than that of the work
effects of the welfare system. Four multi-million dollar income
maintenance experiments have been undertaken for the primary purpose
of estimating the level of labor force withdrawal which is to be
anticipated under a reformed welfare system. A considerable amount
of non-experimental research has also been done for this purpose.
Economists argue that two basic elements in an income maintenance
program affect the work effort of program participants; the guarantee
and the benefit reduction rate (tax rate). These two program elements
influence how recipients will assess the attractiveness of work.
Experimental research and non-experimental research on both the
current and proposed systems have revealed significant relationships
between reduction in work effort and the size of the guarantee and the
tax rate. (Appel, 1972; Watts, 1974; Garfinkel, 1974; Cogan, 1978;
Keeley, et. al., 1977)
Most of the research has shown that male heads of families re-
spond the least to changes in these program parameters, followed by
female heads of families. Wives of working heads (secondary workers)
generally respond more immediately and dramatically to changes in the
"cost of work" than do either of the other gorups. By and large,
male heads of families have a strong attachment to work and changes
in the guarantee and tax rates seem to have a significant effect for
only a small portion of them. (Freidman and Hausman, 1977)
The other finding for which there is wide support is that labor
force withdrawal is more likely for those groups with lower normal
income. Thus, we would expect a greater reduction of work at a given
benefit level and tax rate for those groups where normal income is the
lowest. But since there are far greater concentrations of families as
we move up the income ladder from, say, $1000 to $5000, the danger of
substantial reduction in work effort is contained within a smaller group
of families.
Many have been particularly concerned about the unmeasured work
effects of the current welfare system. The value of many cash and
in-kind benefits often results in high implicit guarantees. Recent
research in New York City demonstrated that the value of multiple
benefits packages that many families received was far higher than
they could generate through work. (Lyon, et al., 1976) Similarly,
the cumulative marginal tax rates which result from multiple bene-
fits are suspected of providing severe inhibitions to labor force
participation among eligible families. (Hausman, 1974) Many of the
existing disincentives and costs of a categorical and multi-program
system go unmeasured. The size and cost of projected reductions
in work effort from a reformed system may therefore seem greater
when compared to the present system than they actually are.
The dominant group on welfare nationally is the female-headed
family. New proposals which extend coverage to male-headed families
are creating the largest amount of concern among researchers and policy
makers because of the uncertainty of their projected labor response.
Profound labor force withdrawal as amesult of new income maintenance
programs is feared for a variety of reasons. Work disincentives
could result in a decline in national output, in the projected
income (and thus, well-being) of the target population and, most
dramatically, in the projected cost of any new program. More important
is the moral conviction, strongly held in this country, that work
ought to be stringently encouraged, if not demanded.
The most recent data on the effects of a reformed welfare system
have come from interim reports from the five year Income Maintenance
Experiment in Seattle-Denver. It reported labor supply effects which
were large and significant. Although it was not possible to dis-
tinguish among the specific labor supply responses of families ex-
posed to different guarantees and tax rates, it was possible to
generalize about the impact of a negative income tax program in
general. The results are consistent with those found in non-ex-
perimental cross-sectional studies. (Keeley, et al., 1977) Husbands
were found to reduce their labor in response to the program by 5.3
percent, wives by 22.0 percent and female heads by 11.2 percent.
Legislative debates during this round of welfare reform pro-
posals, as in past rounds, recognize the work dinincentive effects of
any income transfer system. Those who react most emphatically
against promoting any labor supply decline, at any cost, often call
for strong administrative components, in any new legislation, which
create compulsion to work. The view that the work test is the proper
vehicle to combat the implicit work disincentives in an income
maintenance program has persisted for virtually hundreds of years.
In view of the lack of any solid empirical support for the effective-
ness of administration compulsion to work (Evans, et al., 1975,
Stevens and Austermann, 1975; Stevens, 1974), and the tremendous
resource commitment necessary to attempt to enforce it, it is curious
that it remains a politically necessary component in all proposed
programs.
The Administration and Subcommittee proposals are comprehensive
systems with universal coverage. Presumably a universal approach
would eliminate many of the expensive and inestimable work disincentive
effects of the highly decentralized, categorical, and administratively
complex system of state and local welfare programs which currently
exist. The costs of labor force withdrawal in a universal system must
be weighed, ultimately, after netting out the perverse and highly
costly behavior induced by the current maze of problems.
Nevertheless, the Administration and Subcommittee proposals are
sensitive to the political debate and empirical evidence related to
work effort. For those expected to work, during the job search
period the head of household who is searching for a job is ineligible
for benefits. The effect of this provision is, of course, to remove
a known work disincentive (high guarantee) during the precise time
when one would wish a recipient's work effort to be the strongest.
If work is not found within eight weeks (five weeks in the Subcommittee
proposal), the family would be eligible for the full support available
for families who are not expected to work. The guarantee at this
upper tier would be 2/3 of the poverty line.
The benefit reduction rate would not exceed 50 percent of
earnings for those expected to work. In addition, benefits do not
begin to be reduced until earnings reach $3800. For those on the
lower tier, therefore, benefits are not reduced at all until earnings
exceed $3800. Provisions for state supplementation specify that a
total benefit reduction rate can never exceed 52 percent for combined
federal and state supplemental benefits. To insure that cumulative
rates do not exceed this maximum, the EITC does not begin to be
phased out until earnings exceed the break-even point for benefits.
Clearly this results in providing benefits from the EITC to families
whose incomes are higher than the poverty line. The target efficiency
of this scheme is lower, but the work disincentives of higher tax
rates within theJ8-52 percent range, including the federal payroll
tax on earnings.
*The level at which most research suggests compromising work
disincentive effects against program costs.
**Most tax rate maxima reported in this section come from recent
calculations made by the Urban Institute (Levy, 1978).
For those not expected to work, the maxima are similar, with
the exception of state supplemental benefits which are permitted
to be reduced as rapidly as 70 percent for each dollar of earnings.
Overall tax rates, however, may not exceed 71 percent for this group
of recipients whose work effort is of less concern.
The Subcommittee proposal does not recognize in its provisions
the same importance of work disincentive effects and has different
provisions for tax rate maxima than does the Administration proposal.
For those expected to work, the maximum tax rate, including state
supplemental benefits, may rise as high as 70 percent. The EITC,
unlike that of the Administration proposal, reaches its maximum
level of benefits at a substantially lower level of earnings. Thus
recipients may still be receiving cash benefits when the 6 percent
reduction rate begins for the EITC. Total tax rates, therefore,
may be quite high. They remain at about 64 percent when the EITC
is increasing and can reach 82 percent when it is phasing out.
Similar ranges face those groups not expected to work.
Neither bill, it was mentioned earlier, deals with the problem
of the Medicaid "notch" which results in loss of all Medicaid
eligibility when a dollar of earnings puts recipients above the
break-even level. The implicit marginal tax rate for those who lose
all Medicaid eligibility can, therefore, be several hundred percent.
It is not clear at this state, however, how many recipients will be
eligible for Medicaid in the first place, since there is no provision
to allow initial Medicaid coverage to those recipients who would not
be eligible under the existing system.
Both bills have a "strong" work test. The first part of the
work requirement is facilitated by a distinction by category between
those expected to work and those not expected to work. The criteria
for classification are based, for the most part, on clearly identi-
fiable demographic characteristics. It is not clear, however, how
disability will be determined and how standards of judgment can be
applied uniformly. This is, of course, a major national problem in
the operation of the disability insurance program.
Though the need for complex administrative regulations is mini-
mized, uniformity of eligibility standards for the upper tier will
doubtless be subject to national variation and unavoidable
administrative discretion.
Failure to accept work by the principal earner in both bills
results in a reduction in benefits; that is, the part of the grant
allocated for the principal earner is deducted from the total family
grant. For a family of four, the benefit standard would be reduced
from $4200 to $2300. Enforcement of the work requirement is not too
difficult for those seeking public service jobs. But for jobs in the
private sector the problem remains as difficult as existing enforce-
ment of the work test in AFDC-UF and Food Stamps programs. It is
quite simple for individuals to make themselves appear undesirable
to a potential employer at a job interview. This type of work evasion
is impossible to monitor or control. Administrative machinery set up
to attempt to enforce a work test is expensive and complex. Attempts
at doing so in state and local program administrative levels have not
been successful in altering work behavior of recipients in existing
programs. (Evans, et al., 1975)
Recent research has shown that work is substantial even for wel-
fare recipients. (Rainwater and Rein, 1976) Hausman and Freidman
(1975) point out that even among those 3-4 percent of the participants
in the New Jersey Income Maintenance experiment who did not work, it
was health problems, not distaste for work, which determined their
employment status. Most of those who have studied unemployment spells
among low income workers have found that most of them ultimately return
to work. Thus, the question remains whether a work test is likely to
alter either the incidence of unemployment from job separation or the
length of unemployment spells. The issue is whether the costs of
effective monitoring of a work test, when the results in labor force
participation are apt to be quite small, are worth the displacement of
resources from other more effective forms of employment assistance.
The Ullman bill and the Baker-Bellmon bill retain many of the work
disincentives which exist under the current system due to multiple
benefits from a multiplicity of programs. Nevertheless, certain incre-
mental changes are proposed to deal with many of the egregious
criticisms of the current system. The Ullman bill does nothing to
alter the guarantee facing those expected to work during a job search
period; this is potentially more of a work disincentive than under the
comprehensive plans' lower benefits during job search. Nevertheless,
maximum federal benefit levels are lower than in the other two pro-
posals and do not vary by family size (a potentially weaker work
disincentive effect is therefore present for large families, however
unintended). The bill does eliminate a strong work disincentive
present in the current program, the 100-hour rule governing male-
headed intact families. Provisions for recoupment of yearly benefits
in excess of allowable levels (which results from basing yearly benefit
calculations on earnings from one month) provide potential increased
disincentives.
The Ullman bill establishes a tax ceiling for AFDC and AFDC-UP
at 60 percent, whether or not benefits are supplemented by the states.
Food Stamps (with a benefit reduction rate of 20 percent for incomes
less than $7400 and 40 percent above) are sequenced such that Food
Stamps benefit calculations consider both increases in earnings as well
as decreases in AFDC or AFDC-UF benefits. This helps the problem
of additive tax rates. The EITC supplements earnings up until $5000 and
phases out at a 13 percent rate above $7500. All of these rates,
combined with the federal payroll tax of 6 percent, result in maximum
rates for two-parent families of about 54 percent below $5000 and 74
percent between $5000 and $7500. The rates for female-headed families
are similar but slightly higher.
The work test remains basically unchanged from that of the exist-
ing system. The principal wage earner in two-parent families and
female heads with children over six are required to register for WIN
training and job search activities. If these groups expected to work
fail to register or fail to accept a bona fide job offer, the family is
disqualified for AFDC and Food Stamps. If the female head failed to
register, she would be disqualified, while payments for her children would
still be made, but to a third party.
The same administrative difficulties exist with enforcement of
these work regulations as currently exist and which were described
for the comprehensive proposals. Their inclusion in all the pro-
posals, therefore, must be taken as a political price necessary to
achieve support in a conservative Congress. Similar requirements
were ultimately included in the abortive reform attempts of FAP, with
no additional confidence among planners or administrators in their
necessity or effectiveness.
Of all the proposed legislation, the Baker-Bellmon bill responds
the least with specific provisions to alter the work disincentive
effects of a reformed welfare system. It provides for a single bene-
fit level, even during job search. It does nothing about the "notch"
effect of the 100-hour rule, since it merely replaces a rule based on
hours with one based on earnings. And, finally, it provides additional
work disincentives through the provision for benefit recoupment.
Benefit reduction rates in this bill, which result from a com-
bination of AFDC and AFDC-UF rates of 67 percent, the current Food
Stamps rates, and 20 percent reduction of the EITC above the poverty
line, and the federal payroll tax, reach a maximum of 66 percent above the
poverty line and 101 percent above the poverty line (as the value of
the EITC declines). These rates, in general, apply to both two-
parent families and female headed households. As in the other pro-
posals, no provisions are made to deal with the Medicaid "notch."
Work requirements are similar to those in the Ullman proposal.
Work incentives through low tax rates and low guarantees are
unlikely to have the desired impact when jobs for welfare eligibles
are simply not available. It is therefore important to consider the
strength of the commitment toward job creation in evaluating the
respective impacts the various proposals have on work effort. The
Administration proposal provided the strongest work incentives of
all the proposals currently under consideration. The low tax rates,
combined with the two-tier system, whatever its complexities in ad-
ministration, provide the strongest work incentives of any of the
bills. The work test, it has been argued, may be seen as unimportant
in effecting work effort, but may have a substantial impact on costs
and indirectly drain resources away from more effective employment
assistance.
The provisions for 1.4 million jobs in the Administration pro-
posal goes further in recognizing the limitations of the existing
job market for the low wage workers than any of the others. Though
it is beyond the scope of this paper, serious problems may arise
in designing proper jobs and providing training which will lead to
ultimate employment in the private sector. The current list of jobs
to be designed does not seem to be entirely appropriate for the target
population. Nevertheless, the combination of program parameters and
the jobs components appears to be most consistent with what current
research has been suggesting are necessary components of a reformed
system. The concerns expressed by those who find the level of labor
force withdrawal in the recent income maintenance experiments dis-
turbing, are probably unfounded in a universal system where no
dramatic changes in benefit levels are likely. Indeed, it appears
that if all of the social costs of the current categorical system
are netted out, the costs of the reformed universal system may seem
quite modest.
Family Stability
During the 1960's the rapid growth of the AFDC caseloads moti-
vated concern about the program's impact on the incidence of female
headship and marital instability. The design of the program seems to
support the view that the program itself encouraged, through financial
incentives, marriages to break up or be postponed. This view was
explained through reference to program eligibility requirements which
excluded support in many states for families with an unemployed male.
Restrictive eligibility requirements in states which did operate an
AFDC-UF program provided additional incentives to break up existing
marriages or not form them in the first place, so that a female family
head could become eligible for income support.
The research has not resolved very clearly the precise validity
of these concerns. Indeed, a variety of data sources has yielded
contradictory results. (Cutright and Scanzoni, 1973; Honig, 1973;
Bernstein and Meezan, 1975; Sawhill, et al., 1975; Hoffman and Holmes,
1976) This section, therefore, will describe the emerging theories
of the impact of income transfers and program design on issues of
family stability rather than attempt a proposal-by-proposal comparison,
as in the previous sections. An attempt will be made to review the
trade-offs in the current system against those in a reformed system,
without detailed references to the specific provisions of each of the
major proposals.
The decision to marry or to dissolve a marriage is based on a
complex combination of social, psychological, and economic factors.
Most of the research on the effect of income maintenance systems on
these decisions has concentrated on the economic determinants. Among
those studies which have found a positive and significant relationship
between AFDC and marital instability, the variation explained is always
quite small (e.g. Hoffman and Holmes, 1976; Bernstein and Meezan,
1975).
Nevertheless, the emerging economic theories which attempt to
explain the incidence of family instability among those on welfare
often emphasize two competing economic relationships. One is called
the "independence effect," which relates to the finding that female
income (or income producing capacity), as well as the access of women
to alternative sources of income (i.e. AFDC), relieves the economic
pressure to remain married or to marry. Several researchers have
revealed the existence of this effect. The second effect, known as the
"income effect," relates to the finding that at higher levels of income
the incidence of family disruption appears to decline. This is often
explained by the recognition that at higher levels of income the inter-
personal strains caused by economic insecurity and negative views about
the male role performance are relieved. The table below lays out the
relevant hypotheses and the expected influence that universal and cate-
gorical income maintenance systems are likely to have based on the
hypotheses.
Proponents of a universal income maintenance system, like the
negative income tax, have argued that it will remove the existing
incentives for family splits which are motivated by economic need.
A universal system which bases eligibility for transfers on income
alone (and without any family composition requirements) has been
thought to remove incentives for family break-up among needy families
who wanted to meet the eligibility requirements for income support.
The most recent results of the New Jersey Negative Income Tax
Experiment and the preliminary findings from the Seattle-Denver Income
Maintenance Experiments have produced considerable confusion. In
general, the experiments showed, contrary to expectation, higher
levels of marital dissolution among experimental families than among
comparable controls. Control families were permitted to take advantage
of existing welfare programs. A recent study which has had a consider-
able impact on the debates over the Administration's proposal in
committee points to the danger of inducing even greater family in-
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Explanations about what caused greater levels of family disrup-
tion among the experimental families than the controls usually take
two forms. The first points to weaknesses in the experiments them-
selves, such as non-random attrition. Further, many have suggested
that the results of the experiments are site-specific and cannot be
generalized to a national program. The other attempts to explain
that the findings are of a more theoretical nature. A closer look
at the Seattle-Denver results reveals high rates of family break-up
at low levels of support when compared to the controls, but compar-
able or lower rates at higher levels of support. These results may
be showing that at low levels of support the female "independence
effect" dominates but at higher levels of support the "income effect"
dominates. Therefore, far from suggesting that a negative income tax
should be abandoned, the results may be suggesting that a negative
income tax at a more generous benefit level should be instituted.
Others have interpreted the findings differently. It may be
that the stigma of AFDC constrains women in unhappy marriages from
dissolving them, by inhibiting them from applying for AFDC. The
lack of stigma in a universal system may therefore provide these
women with a non-stigmatizing option for escape. (Bradbury, 1977)
The income maintenance experiments provided experimental families
with a considerable amount of program information about the rules and
regulations of participating. Some researchers have argued that the
experimental families, unlike the controls, were aware that they would
be eligible for continued benefits even if their marriages were to end.
This information may have reduced the costs that those in unhappy
marriages might have perceived in dissolving their marriages.
(Hannan, et al., 1977) Alternatively, it may be that the new partici-
pation of a working make household head in income supplementation under
the experiment undermines the female's view of his role performance.
That is, the receipt of income supplements may be viewed as a signal
by some families that the husband is a failure and, when he is not
able to fulfill his role as breadwinner, marital tension results.
(Bishop, 1978)
These explanations remain largely unresolved. The table above
demonstrated the degree to which categorical programs or universal
programs are hypothesized to effect marriage and separations. Cate-
gorical programs appear to have ony incentives for family dissolution.
Universal programs appear to provide incentives for both decreased and
increased marital dissolutions.
The cash component of the Administration bill and the Subcommittee
bill generally constitutes the archetype of a universal negative in-
come tax program. However, the distinctions made between those who are
expected to work and those who are not, provides a potential for
increased marital dissolution. Though there is no punishment through
withdrawal of benefit eligibility for intact families, there is an
implicit incentive for male heads assigned to the lower tier to abandon
their families. Their families would be eligible for benefits at the
upper tier without the male head. Hausman and Freidman (1977) suggest
that we consider the following example: A two-parent family of four
with at least one young child, and where neither parent works, is
assigned to the lower tier. They are eligible for $2300, but if the
husband leaves, the remaining one-parent family moves to the upper
tier where they become eligible for $3600, or a substantial gain in
benefits. In addition, the separated husband may be eligible for bene-
fits as high as $1100 if he cannot find a job. There exists, therefore,
as in AFDC, a strong financial incentive for the family to dissolve.
The incentive among all eligibles is to move to the tier where the
benefits available are higher. However, this is a dramatic and particu-
lar example which is not likely to be as universally profitable as
is the incentive in the AFDC program.
The view described above that providing income supplements to an
intact family signals the failure of the husband as a breadwinner, is
minimized in the comprehensive proposals through the provision of jobs
and, for those employed, an increase in the value of the EITC. This
sort of income supplement is likely to be less stigmatizing since it
is available at relatively high levels of earnings and this form of
supplementation may be viewed as part of the tax system rather than the
welfare system.
Finally, decisions about marriage and divorce are important long-
range decisions. The immediate effect of the income maintenance experi-
ments may not be borne out over the long run in a new system. Indeed,
the option to leave a bad marriage may be facilitated by the avail-
ability of income support. It may not, however, precipitate such decisions
over the long run. (Ross and Sawhill, 1975)
The added incentives in the current system for illegitimacy,
though not supportable definitively by the research, are removed in
the comprehensive proposals with increased coverage to include single
individuals. The pro-natalist orientation which provides increased
benefits with increased family size remains. Nevertheless, no research
to date has provided convincing evidence that welfare mothers currently
increase their family size for the purpose of increasing their welfare
grants. (Presser and Salsberg, 1975) Results from the New Jersey
negative income tax experiment revealed no significant difference
between the experimentals and controls in their level of fertility.
(Cain, 1974)
The incremental proposals modify somewhat the incentive for
family dissolution by mandating AFDC-UF in all states. Nevertheless,
the Baker-Bellmon bill constrains eligibility for two-parent families
with an arbitrary earnings limit. This is a potential destabilizing
factor. However, if the stigma effect of welfare does indeed operate
to inhibit the female independence effect, retaining the present wel-
fare system in these bills probably will act to stabilize marriages.
If the independence effect dominates at lower levels of support
and the income effect dominates at higher levels, the more generous
benefit levels of the comprehensive proposals may operate to stabilize
marriages. Further, it has been suggested that in programs with high
marginal tax rates a male head (principal earner) may leave the family
to protect his earnings. (MacDonald and Sawhill, 1978) The lower tax
rates in the Administration proposal may inhibit family dissolution
for this reason.
Much of the impact of the various proposals on family stability
is mere conjecture. The empirical evidence and the theory are not
consistent. A more important issue may be whether some additional
family break-up is worth the price for reform. Few of these studies
have provided any evidence on the nature of the marriages which dis-
solved. Bernstein and Meezan (1975), in a small sample of New York
welfare mothers, did provide this kind of evidence. Many of the
women in the dissolved marriages reported a high incidence of drug
addiction, alcoholism, violence, and infidelity among their departed
spouses. As a matter of public policy, permitting women in unhappy
marriages the financial option to leave their husbands, may not be
such a bad thing. Marital stability,for its own sake, does not appear
to be a suitable dictum nor a sufficiently critical priority for
which adequate support and equity ought to be compromised. Indeed,
withdrawal of all income maintenance support is likely to increase
female dependence on marriage, thereby increasing marital stability.
It is not, however, reasonable to compromise the other important goals
of income maintenance reform for the continuation of marriages of
unknown quality. Finally, it is not at all clear whether such fears
will be realized in a new program. Evidence appears mixed and the
alternatives are not terribly attractive.
Costs
Although critically important issues of public policy are raised
by the current crop of welfare reform bills presently before Congress,
it is likely that many decisions on program content will be subordinated
to considerations of program costs. The recent description of President
Carter's principles for National Health Insurance reflects the over-
riding priority that questions of national economic health will have
in determining any new social programs. Indeed, the proposal conditions
the timing of phasing in national health insurance on the state of the
national economy.
All the critical dimensions of welfare reform addressed in the
previous sections may ultimately rest on their cost rather than any
loftier concerns such as equity or adequacy. Small changes in program
parameters can have a very significant impact on overall program
costs. For example, the higher the guarantee and the lower the tax
rate in any proposed cash assistance program, the higher the cost of
the program. Lower tax rates and higher guarantees result in extend-
ing the break-even level of income. Therefore, benefits continue
to be paid to families with higher incomes. As the break-even increases,
given the current income distribution, larger numbers of families
concentrated at higher levels of income become eligible for benefits.
Therefore, the lower tax rates and the higher guarantees of the Ad-
ministration proposal represent substantially larger resource commitments
than either of the incremental bills.
Data on labor force withdrawal from the Seattle-Denver Income
Maintenance experiment has been a great help in simulating the program
costs of a reformed system. (DHEW, 1978) Labor force withdrawal can
be estimated, using experimental results on the basis of proposed tax
rates and guarantee levels. Further, recent results have shown that
variations in program participation rates are related to these program
parameters. Both of these considerations influence the ultimate cost
of a program.
Additional factors which have significant impacts on program costs
are the number of persons eligible for benefits and the length of time
an eligible recipient is required to wait until he or she is placed in
a public service job. (Levy, 1978) The number of eligibles is dependent
first on the break-even level of income as determined by the guarantee
and the tax rate. Equally as critical is the proposed program cover-
age. Obviously, whatever the guarantee and the tax rate, if the
coverage is quite limited, such as to families with children exclusively,
the costs will be far less than if coverage is universal.
The Administration and Subcommittee proposals propose coverage
to all low income families. Included in eligibility for cash assistance
will therefore be groups who are now only eligible for Food Stamps.
Benefit levels in these comprehensive proposals are higher than Food
Stamps benefit levels for these groups and absolute benefit levels are
higher for cash assistance than for AFDC and AFDC-UF recipients in some
states.
Levy (1978) points out that the incremental bills are concerned
with the more limited coverage of AFDC and AFDC-UF populations.
Though both bills expand AFDC coverage, by setting a minimum national
benefit standard and mandating AFDC-UF in all states, they also move
a number of AFDC recipients into public service jobs. "The net result
is a decrease in cash assistance (as distinct from public service wages)
going to the poor. A similar effect exists in the Administration and
Subcommittee bills but it is more than offset by the new groups who are
eligible for cash assistance." (p. 12)
The Administration and Subcommittee proposals require a relatively
short job search period before eligibles can be placed in public
service jobs. The Ullman and Baker-Bellmon proposals require consid-
erably longer job search periods (16 weeks for the Ullman bill and 90
days for the Baker-Bellmon bill). Considerable variations exist in the
resources allocated for public service jobs, though all the bills
claim to provide them for all eligibles. The difference in waiting
period influences the number of jobs required and this, in turn,
distinguishes the amount of resources required to provide the necessary
jobs. Given the differences in the definition of eligibles and the
length of the waiting periods, a substantial determinant of overall
program costs can be explained by the job component. Indeed, as Levy
has demonstrated, the differences in the cash and jobs components of
the four bills account for most of the total difference among their
total costs.
A variety of specific rules and regulations which have not been
described in previous sections may also result in significant changes
in program costs. Decisions about the period over which income will
be counted for benefits determination (the accounting period), the
maximum benefit level a family can receive as their family size
increases, the limitation on assets, rules governing disability
determination, the method of indexing benefits for changes in the cost
of living, and a myriad of other program features all influence
aggregate program costs. Often, small changes in these features
can have profound cost implications.
Table 4 presents a breakdown of estimated new (net) federal
program costs for each of the proposals. The interest here has been
to calculate incremental costs or total cost minus the offsets produced
by reductions in other programs. (Levy, 1978) Clearly, these are
only crude estimates. A variety of assumptions were necessary, in-
cluding the projected state of the national economy and the amounts
states will choose to supplement federal benefit levels.
The Subcommittee proposal has the largest overall program costs
but by no means the highest level of fiscal relief for the states
and localities. The Ullman proposal and the Baker-Bellmon proposal
are the least costly, but they do not provide the same level of new
fiscal relief to the states. In fact, the Baker-Bellmon proposal
provides fiscal relief consistent with that projected for the
Administration proposal.
TABLE 4
BREAKDOWN OF NEW FEDERAL PROGRAM COSTS FOR
ALTERNATIVE WELFARE REFORM PROPOSALS, 1982*
(billions of 1982 dollars)
Administration
Bill
1) New funds in cash
assistance and food $2.68
stamps
2) New funds in public
service jobs & the
WIN program
3) New funds in the
Earned Income
Tax Credit





5) New fiscal relief



















*The data on the Administration and Subcommittee bills can be found
in a cost memo sent from Alice M. Rivlin, Director of CBO, to Rep.
James C. Corman (undated). The data on the Baker-Bellmon bill can
be found in a cost memo sent from Rivlin to Sen. Henry Bellmon
(undated). In particular, the Baker-Bellmon bill costed by CBO did
not include regulations for "recoupment," the process by which wel-
fare recipients repay some or all of their AFDC and Food Stamp
benefits if their annual income is above a set level.
Cost estimates taken from "Summary of the Ullman Welfare Reform Proposal."
document prepared by the House Ways & Means Committee Staff, Feb. 7, 1978.
** This number will be lower (more negative) when benefit recoupment
is taken into account.
Source: Levy, 1978; Table 1, p. 11.
Several analysts of the Administration proposal have suggested
that extreme caution must be exercised in accepting the cost estimates
of the proposal. (Miles, 1978; Freidman and Hausman, 1977) Both
the Administration proposal and the Subcommittee proposal require
totally new administrative structures. In particular, the jobs
component requires entirely new machinery for job creation, job
placement, and monitoring and enforcement of the work test. No ex-
perience to date provides comparable data necessary to estimate the
national costs of such a large scale undertaking with this kind of
target population.
It is extremely difficult, and perhaps somewhat misleading, to
make judgments looking at these comparative program costs in isolation.
Even assuming that the estimates reflect more or less what actual program
costs will be, the real question remains whether or not twice as much
is achieved by double the expenditures from the Administration and
Subcommittee bills as compared to the Ullman and Baker-Bellmon bills.
The previous sections have stressed the very modest changes that the
incremental bills are likely to have. Because we have more experi-
ence with existing programs, it is easier to estimate the relative
impact of these modest changes. The comprehensive bills are quite costly
and are attempting more universal changes. They also attempt major
goals with which we have had far less experience and the impact of which
we can predict with far less certainty. Nevertheless, it appears from
all of the analyses of human waste and suffering, as well as of the
perverse incentives and administrative complexities in the existing
system, that considerable weight is added to the argument that
fundamental change is required.
Though program costs are likely to have a critical impact on
legislative action, it is probably well to remember that they reflect
the actual qualitative distinctions in program goals and potential
outcomes. Whether or not such social goals can dominate the debate
on the relative merits of competing strategies may rest on a variety
of exogenous economic factors such as the state of the economy.
Current analysis of the present political climate indicates that
welfare reform of a comprehensive nature does not occupy a priority
position among the majority of legislators. Though both the Adminis-
tration and officials at DHEW have taken considerable pride in their
effort to design their legislation in response to the best and most
recent results of empirical research, the political process is unlikely
to commit the amount of resources required for passage.
CAN WELFARE BE REFORMED?
There are two ways to answer the question of whether or not welfare
can be reformed. The first attempts a strictly programmatic analysis
which addresses the program criticisms of the current system. Based
on the analysis of current research findings, it appears quite likely
that with the necessary political and resource commitment many of the
most disturbing features of the current welfare system can probably
be marginally rectified. The Carter plan, though not without its
weaknesses, makes the best legislative attempt to date to address
these problems rationally.
The implicit endorsement of a Carter-like plan is conditioned
in this paper exclusively on the degree to which it maximizes the
goals which have emerged as central to the current political agenda.
No attempt has been made to evaluate the criticisms leveled upon
it by other important interest groups. For example, critics from
the social welfare establishment reject the Carter plan as real reform
based on its punitive treatment of those expected to work during
their eight week job search. In addition, benefit levels below the
poverty line and the insistance on a work test are viewed as distaste-
ful if not unacceptable by those whose assumptions for reform include
values derived from socialist notions of a mature welfare state.
Though the author is aware of these alternative values for
assessing welfare reform approaches, it has not been the goal of this
paper to consider goals other than those which have emerged as central
to the political debate. More extensive analysis of these questions
would, however, be critical to a final endorsement of any major
approaches to poverty reduction.
Nevertheless, a second way to answer the question about whether
Carter's plan constitutes true reform involves a more important
institutional analysis. Though the legislative debates continue
to place undue concern on issues related to work effort, recent
research on low income males has shown their work effort to be
substantial. (Levy, 1976) The real problems for these workers are
low wages and large families. Other research on the secondary labor
market has indicated that many low income males will never achieve
adequate income because labor market segmentation precludes their
access to employment in those industries where on-the-job training and
"ladders" for upward mobility are available. (Doeringer and Piore, 1971).
Welfare reform of the universal sort typified by the Carter
plan attempts to respond, through income supplementation, to the
consequences of these market imperfections. It does not, however,
attempt a more fundamental reform of the determinants of low wages
and poverty which go to the very root of the market system. Pro-
vision of public service employment responds to an immediate problem
of insufficient jobs. No attempt has been made to alter the incentive
and reward structure in the private market which determines the
structure of wages and the level of employment. Though Administration
spokesmen continue to argue that placement in public service jobs
is only temporary, and that the expectation is that low income
workers will move swiftly from public to private employment, there
are no indications as to how this will occur without more fundamental
changes in the economy.
Welfare reform of a programmatic nature is clearly indicated.
Any advanced industrial economy will have those individuals and
families who cannot provide for themselves. Providing an equitable,
decent, and non-stigmatizing system for income support is incumbent
upon a nation which claims to adhere to principles of the modern
Welfare State. Nevertheless, there has always been an inherent
conflict in the United States between the goals of the Welfare
State and the goals of a capitalist economy. Fear of interfering
with the labor market has always constrained social policy
initiatives. One of the current debates over whether wages paid
for public service employment should be set at the level of the
minimum wage or the prevailing wage focuses on just such conflicts.
Strongly held ideological positions about work and income
support have required all legislation to include politically motivated
components (e.g. the work test). The compromises struck between real
efforts at poverty reduction and politically acceptable reform continue
to be uneasy. Nevertheless, it is unlikely in a period of growing
conservatism and skepticism about any government initiative that a
more radical type of reform than that represented by the Adminis-
tration's reform proposal is realistic. Based on the comparative
analysis of the current legislative alternatives, it is likely to
achieve a variety of modest but important social reforms.*
*Regrettably at the final editing of this paper, a new and less
ambitious plan has been introduced by the president. Far from
achieving the modest goals of PBJI, it resembles far more closely
the incremental bills reviewed here. Legislative analysts argue
that even this pared down version ($5.7 billion) has little likelihood
of passage in the present political climate.
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